Electronic Surveillance Law and the
Intra-Agency Separation of Powers
By PAUL OHM*

Introduction

T

HE QUESTION FOR REFORM of our statutory electronic surveillance laws is no longer “if” but “when.” By declaring a significant part
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) unconstitutional in United States v. Warshak,1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit gave Congress the push it needs to fix an outdated statute. In Warshak, the Sixth Circuit held that the FBI may not obtain
copies of the content of email messages stored with email providers
without a warrant, invalidating an important part of ECPA.2 Yet,
outside of the Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction, the police may continue to
request email from providers with less than a warrant. As a result, the
constitutional questions faced in Warshak will likely bubble up in other
courts. I predict most courts of appeals will follow the lead and borrow
from the sound reasoning of the Sixth Circuit by declaring the same
provisions of ECPA unconstitutional.3
Eventually, Congress will act. That a provision of a federal statute
authorizes an unconstitutional process is a bit of an embarrassment.
That the provision represents a critical part of the principal statutory
scheme regulating online search and seizure is much worse. What
ECPA allows the police to do without a warrant calls into question
core values like free speech and association; freedom to think, read,
and communicate; and other values like innovation, economic
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. Thanks to the editors of
the University of San Francisco Law Review and Professor Susan Freiwald for inviting me to
take part in this symposium. Many of the anecdotal observations in this piece are based
upon my personal observations, developed while I served as a trial attorney in the Justice
Department’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, from 2001 to 2005.
1. 631 F.3d 266 (2010).
2. Id. at 288.
3. Id. (holding that an email subscriber possesses a Fourth Amendment reasonable
expectation of privacy in email stored with a provider by analogy to telephone calls and
sealed letters and distinguishing records falling within the third party exception).
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growth, and the moral standing to shame foreign governments that
want to crack down on their citizens’ use of the Internet. Congress
should embrace ECPA reform, and it should act soon. Two promising
beginnings are reforms that have been proposed by a coalition calling
itself Digital Due Process (“DDP”)4 and several pieces of draft legislation proposed by Senator Leahy.5
Even if Congress enacts these reforms, they alone would not be
enough to strike the proper balance between law enforcement need
and online privacy. ECPA will still present ambiguities, particularly
when it applies to emerging technologies. Many of these ambiguities
will be hashed out internally within the Justice Department long
before they ever come to the attention of judges, advocates, and academics on the outside. ECPA reform is necessary for protecting privacy online, but it is not nearly sufficient.
This essay undertakes a novel institutional analysis of electronic
surveillance. Institutional analyses in criminal procedure scholarship
are somewhat rare and often they amount to a macro-level weighing
of relative institutional competencies.6 This essay is premised on the
idea that we might find new solutions to vexing old problems—in this
case, protecting individual and group privacy from undue invasion by
government electronic surveillance—by taking detailed account of
the internal structures of the machinery of law enforcement.
Specifically, this essay builds on a proposal by Neal Katyal, who
argued for the use of internal—in other words, within one branch of
government—separations of power.7 Katyal recommended separating
power between different, co-equal executive branch departments—
the State and Defense Departments—on matters of national security.8
This kind of inter-agency approach will not work in the realm of elec4. See generally About the Issue, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org
(last visited Jan. 15, 2013) (calling for amendments to ECPA requiring search warrants for
access to stored content or location, stepped up judicial review for pen registers, and limits
on non-particularized, dragnet surveillance).
5. See generally H.R. 2471, 112th Cong. tit. II (2012) (as reported by S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, Nov. 29, 2012) (requiring search warrants for stored contents); Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th Cong. (2011) (requiring
search warrants for stored contents and location).
6. See, e.g., Patricia Bellia, Designing Surveillance Law, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 332 (2011)
(suggesting that “institutional competence tend[s] to oversimplify the surveillance law
landscape”).
7. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).
8. Id. at 2325–27.
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tronic surveillance given the need for criminal law enforcement to
have sole and entire control over their criminal investigations.
Instead, this essay proposes introducing intra-agency separations
of powers that pit part of the Justice Department against itself, creating competition for interpretations of statutory and constitutional surveillance law. Specifically, the Criminal Division of the Justice
Department already allocates responsibility for electronic surveillance
in two distinct sections: the Office of Enforcement Operations
(“OEO”) and the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section
(“CCIPS”). Yet, it seems the two sections tend to divide responsibility
for different questions of electronic surveillance and rarely embrace
overlapping authority. By encouraging additional joint deliberation
between these two sections, this essay proposes a novel way to improve
the richness of the debate over electronic surveillance; notice and participation of higher-ranking Justice Department officials; and the possibility for helpful second opinions. The hope is that these changes
will more often lead to better results.
This essay proceeds in two parts. Part I argues that current proposals for the reform of electronic surveillance law focus solely on inter-branch solutions, which cannot by themselves assure privacy in the
face of technological change. Part II performs a micro-scale institutional description of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department—revealing that OEO and CCIPS have been given similar, but
non-overlapping, authority over electronic surveillance law—and argues for reform to bring these two sections into more frequent debate
and discussion.

I.

The Need to Supplement the Inter-Branch Review of
Electronic Surveillance

The inter-branch check—by way of requiring a judge’s permission before conducting electronic surveillance—is not enough by itself to protect privacy from overreaching or abusive police practices.
Today’s rules impose significant limits on the amount of information
judges receive and the amount of discretion judges wield. Even if we
were to reform electronic surveillance law to significantly increase the
power of judges, we would still face intrinsic limits that should encourage us to seek extra-judicial forms of protection.
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A. The Limits of Today’s Judicial Review
Today’s electronic surveillance laws, both constitutional and statutory, do not give judges enough power to access the facts underlying
police requests for permission to conduct surveillance nor enough discretion to refuse those requests. Under some statutes, the judicial role
is merely ceremonial. Even worse, these limits on judicial review are
not distributed uniformly across contexts. Judges seem to have the
least amount of power in the types of cases we worry about the most:
those involving invasive new forms of technology.
Today’s laws leave many forms of electronic surveillance unregulated, assigning no role whatsoever to the judicial branch. Courts have
interpreted the word “search” in the Fourth Amendment to set forth a
binary distinction: some acts of electronic surveillance are regulated
by the Fourth Amendment, and others are not.9 Unless a statute indicates otherwise, the police are free to conduct surveillance in the latter category without ever consulting a judge. Thus, the Court in Smith
v. Maryland10 held that pen registers, which record the numbers dialed on a particular telephone line, are not searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, thereby permitting the police to
conduct a pen register without a warrant.11 Citing Smith, lower courts
have found other acts of electronic surveillance not to be searches
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, such as non-content
monitoring of Internet traffic12 and access to basic subscriber information stored by an Internet service provider.13
When Congress enacted ECPA, it diverged from the simple binary model of the Constitution by creating intermediate levels of inter-branch protection and requiring the police to seek court orders in
particular situations that otherwise would not have required the interbranch check.14 Despite these attempts to increase judicial involvement above the Fourth Amendment floor, ECPA still allows a fair
amount of electronic surveillance by the police without an interbranch check. Using only a subpoena, for example, the police can
obtain some forms of content stored with providers, as well as basic
subscriber information, such as name, address, and billing informa9. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that government’s electronic surveillance and recording of petitioner’s words while using a telephone
booth constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
10. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
11. Id. at 739–46.
12. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509, 513 (9th Cir. 2008).
13. United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va. 1999).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2006).
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tion.15 Even more significantly, ECPA protects the privacy of the content of stored records for only two categories of providers, “electronic
communications services” and “remote computing services.”16 Neither
category likely covers many types of online providers, such as e-commerce sites and web publishers, giving the police the freedom to obtain sensitive records with no judicial check.17
Even when electronic surveillance law grants judges a role in approving electronic surveillance, it too often fails to give them the tools
they need to administer meaningful oversight. The best example is
the Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices Act.18 This law—which
governs real-time surveillance of non-content information, such as
telephone numbers dialed, websites visited, and email to/from information—grants judges an exceedingly limited role. Judges “shall”
grant the government an order to conduct the surveillance “if the
court finds that the attorney for the Government has certified to the
court that the information likely to be obtained . . . is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation.”19 This language does not appear to
require the police to divulge any facts about its investigation, and at
least one court has called the judge’s role merely “ministerial.”20 Although this is the most glaring example of how judicial review alone is
an insufficient safeguard for privacy, there are other, less egregious
examples.21
These limits of judicial supervision in today’s electronic surveillance law are not evenly distributed. Instead, judges probably participate least in some of the most worrisome cases: those involving
cutting-edge technology. Think of the practice and law of electronic
surveillance as falling into three rough categories. The first category
can be characterized as “Settled.” This category includes practices that
are long-established, well-known, and fully litigated. The police (and
the public) know precisely where such practices fit within the constitu15. Id. § 2703(c)(2).
16. Id. §§ 2510, 2711.
17. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1230–31 (2004) (arguing that eBay is not
covered by the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”)).
18. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2006).
19. Id. § 3123(a).
20. See United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995).
21. Consider, for example, ECPA’s “d-order” standard, which gives access to various
kinds of content and non-content information stored with a provider. 18 U.S.C § 2703(d)
(2006). Some have criticized the standard as providing too low a hurdle for access to such
private information. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 175–76 (2007).
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tional and statutory laws of electronic surveillance, and fights over
these techniques are now rare. Some examples include: pen registers
and trap-and-trace devices for telephone numbers or email headers,
which fall within the Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices Act
(“Pen Register Act”);22 requests to providers for basic subscriber information associated with an account username or other identifier;23 and
surveillance using silent video.24
To be clear, some continue to be dissatisfied with the rules governing the Settled category. Many grumble about the low standards
allowed under the Pen Register Act, for example.25 But they complain
in these cases about the quality of the privacy protection, not about
the meaning of the Act, and they direct these complaints toward the
legislature, not the courts.
The second category we might call the “Leading Edge.” This includes practices that have been in use for some time yet continue to
sit under clouds created by ambiguities in the laws and have yet to be
resolved in litigation. Two of the highest profile battles in recent years
have involved Leading Edge fights over cell-site location26 and the use
of court orders to obtain the content of email messages.27 These
courtroom battles exemplify where the inter-branch function operates
best. Calls to reform electronic surveillance law focus mostly on Leading Edge fights, and indeed, current reform calls focus much of their
attention on location and email.28
Finally, the “Bleeding Edge” category refers to relatively new practices, often involving emerging technologies. Not only have Bleeding
Edge practices failed to receive a careful vetting in court, but they are
also often completely unknown outside law enforcement. The police
experiment with new technologies long before they ever deploy them
widely, and they can use them without revealing that fact to the public
for years. In fact, even once the public discovers the police’s use of a
possible new technique, it will not be until the police actually use it to
22. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2006).
23. See id. § 2703(c)(2).
24. See United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882–83 (7th Cir. 1984).
25. See, e.g., Our Principles, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.
cfm?objectid=99629E40-2551-11DF-8E02000C296BA163 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Our Principles] (principle number three urges at least a “d order” standard for pen
register and trap and trace orders).
26. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
28. See, e.g., Our Principles, supra note 26.
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gather evidence and bring charges against a criminal defendant that
the courts will have an opportunity to conduct judicial review.
We have seen this pattern play out repeatedly. There were rumors
that the FBI had been using home-grown spyware techniques to
search pseudonymous email accounts for years before one case was
confirmed.29 A similar pattern of rumor without official confirmation
(much less opportunity for judicial review) has accompanied the police uses of key logging techniques,30 drones,31 cell-site simulators
(such as “stingray”),32 honeypots,33 the repurposing of cell phones,34
and in-car navigation devices35 as hidden microphones. In fact, none
of these relatively vintage technologies has been brought before judicial review any more than a handful of times, and some have never
been reviewed.
The problem may in fact be becoming much worse with the rise
of new technologies that attack “public facts.”36 For example, the police may be collecting DNA from public places37—lifting a target’s discarded coffee cup, for example—and using facial recognition
technologies to identify people on surveillance video.38 Last term, the
Supreme Court began to struggle with these issues in United States v.
Jones,39 the “GPS Beeper” case. Although the Court found the use of
the GPS tracking device in that case to be a Fourth Amendment
search, the majority reasoned on relatively narrow grounds,40 and only
in the concurrences did the Justices advance theories that might ex29. See Kevin Poulsen, FBI’s Secret Spyware Tracks Down Teen Who Made Bomb Threats,
WIRED (July 18, 2007), http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2007/07/fbi_spyware.
30. See United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001).
31. Peter Finn, Domestic Use of Aerial Drones by Law Enforcement Likely to Prompt Privacy
Debate, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/22/AR2011012204111.html.
32. See Jennifer Valentino-Devries, ‘Stingray’ Phone Tracker Fuels Constitutional Clash,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904194604
576583112723197574.html.
33. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 415, 471–72 (2012).
34. Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, FBI Taps Cell Phone Mic as Eavesdropping Tool,
CNET NEWS (Dec. 1, 2006), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1029_3-6140191.html.
35. See In re Order Authorizing Roving Interception of Oral Commc’ns, 349 F.3d 1132
(9th Cir. 2003).
36. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004).
37. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic
Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 862–74 (2006).
38. Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
39. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
40. Id. at 949–53.
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tend beyond relatively narrow contexts.41 It may be years or longer
before the courts provide definitive guidance. Judicial review of techniques that act on public facts is even less likely to occur sooner than
other Bleeding Edge techniques, such as spyware or key loggers. This
is because no statute purports to regulate these facts, and the police
(and the prosecutors who advise them) are probably not yet altering
their behavior significantly in anticipation of a possible sea change in
Fourth Amendment law. It is thus very likely that the police will embrace public facts surveillance long before the judiciary subjects them
to any scrutiny.
We tell hopeful stories about the power of the judiciary to check
police surveillance abuses. These stories neglect the deeply embedded
structural tendencies that shield so many worrisome Bleeding Edge
techniques from review.
B. Why Legal Reform Offers No Panacea
If today’s laws fall short of giving judges meaningful oversight
over electronic surveillance, isn’t the answer to expand the judicial
role? Reforming ECPA to give judges more power over electronic surveillance is imperative. ECPA is riddled with too many holes in coverage that leave unregulated access to some of the most sensitive online
services. The Pen Register Act provides no effective judicial review.
Courts should reassess the way they construe the Fourth Amendment
to take better account for the way new technology invades privacy.
Although legal reform is one answer, it is not the only answer. There are
several limits to relying on legal reform to increase the power of
judges in this space.
The first limit is temporal: any reform of ECPA or the Fourth
Amendment will take time. Even though the DDP movement has
brought new energy to calls to amend ECPA, and even though the
first bill embracing some of the DDP principles has been voted out of
committee, full passage seems unlikely any time soon.42 It may take
years before we see meaningful and comprehensive ECPA reform. In
the meantime, we need to supplement the weak forms of inter-branch
review under the current law.
Second, any form of ECPA reform will be necessarily incomplete,
leaving significant forms of electronic surveillance outside any judicial
41. Id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 962–63 (Alito, J., concurring).
42. David Kravets, Senate Committee Approves Bill Requiring Warrants for E-Mail, WIRED
THREAT LEVEL (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/11/ecpa-reformapproved/.
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check. Advocates of the DDP reform movement, for example, have
proposed four reforms to ECPA: a warrant requirement for police access to content stored with any Internet provider; a warrant requirement for access to mobile phone location information; more
searching judicial review of requests for pen register orders; and the
end of dragnet surveillance of records with a mere subpoena.43 To be
sure, these proposals would significantly increase the judicial role over
electronic surveillance, especially the first proposal. Yet even if these
reforms were fully enacted, they would still allow significant freedom
of police surveillance without judicial involvement. DDP has not
called, for example, for reform of the rules for government access to
“basic subscriber information,” which can be obtained with a subpoena.44 Nor has DDP advocated extending ECPA to cover additional
types of providers, even though the statute arguably does not cover ecommerce sites, news sites, web advertisers, and other potential
sources for leads in investigations.45 ECPA reform is unlikely to embrace all four of DDP’s requests. It is far more likely that legislators
will seek a compromise—one that responds to the concerns that law
enforcement officials have expressed.46
More fundamentally, ECPA currently allows a vast amount of surveillance without judicial review through the many exceptions that the
law provides. Providers can voluntarily provide customer records to
the police, for example, if they reasonably believe there is an emergency situation.47 They can also hand over customer records with the
43. Our Principles, supra note 26.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2006).
45. See Kerr, supra note 17, at 1230–31. Kerr’s reasoning would possibly extend to
other providers that neither “provide[ ] users . . . the ability to send or receive” communications under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15), nor provide “computer storage or processing services”
under § 2711(2). 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006) (defining “electronic communications service”); id. § 2711(2) (defining “remote computing service”); see also Kerr, supra note 17, at
1230 (“The legislative history indicates that ‘processing services’ refer to outsourcing
functions.”).
46. For example, in September 2012, Senator Leahy introduced a bill that would implement only the first of the four DDP principles, search warrants for content. See Declan
McCullagh, Senators Prepare to Vote on Netflix and E-mail Privacy, CNET NEWS (Sept. 20,
2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57516501-38/senators-prepare-to-vote-on-netflix-and-e-mail-privacy/. In another sign that ECPA reform cannot happen without political
compromise, the proposal attaches the fix to a separate measure that weakens privacy protection in the Video Privacy Protection Act. See Mark M. Jaycox & Lee Tien, ECPA Reform
May Require Warrants for Email, But Hurts Video Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG (Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/09/ecpa-reform-may-require-warrants-email-hurt-video-privacy.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8), (c)(4) (2006).
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consent of their customers,48 and many terms of service are so sweeping as to arguably constitute that consent.49
Similarly, those who have argued for an expanded judicial role
over electronic surveillance under the Fourth Amendment nevertheless preserve freedom for some extra-judicial police action. Dan
Solove, for example, has argued that the courts should abandon the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test for determining when a
search has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.50
In its place, Professor Solove would apply constitutionally mandated
procedures any time police “information gathering . . . causes
problems of reasonable significance.”51 However, this test already appears to exclude some forms of information gathering, although Professor Solove intends for it to pose a very low hurdle.52 Moreover,
activities covered by Professor Solove’s test need not always require
judicial review and a warrant, as Professor Solove is open to other,
lower forms of procedural processes.53 To similar effect, Chris
Slobogin has long championed a “proportionality principle” for the
Fourth Amendment, according to which the justification required for
a search or seizure will vary proportionately with the invasiveness of
the action.54 But Professor Slobogin’s examples demonstrate that proportionality also allows some police action without a judicial check.55
Third, although we should increase the role of the judiciary over
electronic surveillance, there should be limits to how much we require
the courts to be involved, lest we interfere too much with the efficiency of the police. Electronic surveillance law must balance the need
to detect and prevent crime against the privacy of the people.56 Striking this balance right should mean letting a nimble police force respond quickly to imminent threats and crimes without having to clear
unnecessary hurdles. Specifically, police work happens iteratively. A
48. Id. § 2702(b)(3), (c)(2).
49. Cf. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding no Fourth
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy in work computer because of agreement to
privacy policy allowing monitoring of Internet use).
50. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1528 (2010).
51. Id.
52. See id. at 1529 (“Under this approach, the Fourth Amendment would likely apply
to a very broad range of government information gathering activities.”).
53. Id. at 1529–30 (showing a willingness to consider the practical consequences of a
particular enforcement mechanism for Fourth Amendment violations rather than imposing a “one-size-fits-all rule requiring a warrant supported by probable cause”).
54. SLOBOGIN, supra note 22, at 21–47.
55. Id.
56. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 481–82 (2011).
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police investigation—either in the real world or online—often begins
with speculative leads and great uncertainty.57 Police officers rely on
training, intuition, and even an occasional hunch to develop more
certainty. There is no categorical reason to deny the police access to
all electronic information during the earliest stages of their investigations. Some forms of electronic police work seem to pose so slight a
threat to privacy that they should be allowed without a judicial check.
The only question is where we draw the line.
For example, a sound balance in ECPA should permit the police
the freedom to use public domain resources such as web search engines, publicly available databases, and websites without the need for
judicial approval.58 The police need not ask a judge for permission to
use Google, the WHOIS database, or Wikipedia. Also, ECPA reform
should further the ability of the police to issue a grand jury subpoena
directly to the target of the investigation requesting copies of content,
for example, requests to obtain copies of email from the account
owner not the provider.59
But if we agree to leave some police behavior outside the interbranch check of judicial review, we should find other ways to monitor
this behavior for abuses. The next section explores a novel possibility:
expanded use of intra-agency review. But it is important to reiterate
that any new extra-judicial checks we identify can work in conjunction
with judicial review. This is not an either-or choice.

II.

The Department of Justice and the Internal Separation of
Powers

A. Substituting a Judicial Check with an Internal Separation of
Powers
If practical or prudential reasons prevent us from imposing judicial scrutiny in some cases, we should ask, what is it about a judge’s
scrutiny that disciplines police behavior? Once we enumerate these
qualities, we might find them in other places. First, a judge must have
enough information to understand the facts of the investigation. Second, a judge’s interests must not align perfectly with the interests of
57. Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justification Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514, 1527 (2010).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2006) (allowing exception to ECPA in cases involving
communications that are “readily accessible to the general public”).
59. Kerr, supra note 17, at 1211–12. The recipient of the subpoena is of course able to
ask a judge to quash the subpoena. See Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 806 (2005) (discussing motions to quash subpoenas).
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the investigators. Finally, a reviewing judge must be granted the discretion to either refuse the request or at least slow things down in
order to obtain more information. Although judges may be well positioned to satisfy these requirements, they do not alone possess a monopoly on these qualities. Indeed, we can find parties possessing the
same three qualities we find in judges—access to information, nonaligned interests, and discretion—within the executive branch. In
fact, we can find it within the Justice Department itself.
This argument builds on the work of Neal Katyal, law professor
and former Acting Solicitor General.60 Professor Katyal, writing about
national security law after 9/11, spotlighted the little noticed checking
function that occurs within the executive branch.61 In an uncommon
twist, he celebrated bureaucracy.62
Professor Katyal focuses specifically on inter-agency checking, advocating for rules that assign more than one agency oversight over
national security decisions and the power and incentive to check one
another.63 For example, he celebrates the fact that the State Department and the Defense Department often find themselves needing to
convince the White House of the relative virtues of proposals having
to do with terrorism.64 Rather than a redundant inefficiency deserving
to be driven out, Katyal recommends ways to bolster the bureaucratic
overlap.65
But national security law and policy during the war on terror differ significantly from the day-to-day grind of discrete criminal investigations in which most electronic surveillance questions arise. The
kind of national security decisions on which Katyal focuses include
large, complex, and inherently international geopolitical puzzles. It
makes sense that the State Department and Defense Department—
not to mention the Justice Department and intelligence community—
all play a part in the deliberations around such questions. In contrast,
any given criminal investigation tends to be the province of one
agency—usually the Justice Department but sometimes the Department of Homeland Security. International cooperation is still too rare
to involve the State Department very often, and the USA PATRIOT
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Katyal, supra note 8.
Id. at 2316.
Id. at 2317.
Id. at 2319–20.
Id. at 2327.
Id.
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Act notwithstanding, there remain walls between most criminal cases
and national security investigations.
If we want to harness the benefits of bureaucratic overlap, we
need to do it within the organization chart of a single agency. As we
will see in one case study, modern executive branch agencies like the
Justice Department are so large and multifarious that we can replicate
Katyal’s benefits of bureaucracy within a single agency.
B. Electronic Surveillance and the Criminal Division66
In order to craft opportunities for bureaucratic overlap and
checking within the Justice Department itself, we need to engage in a
rather unglamorous excavation of the internal structure of the
agency. This is a very specific inquiry, one that is difficult to generalize
to other agencies, and indeed, one that may accurately depict the
truth during only a limited snapshot in time. As the Justice Department evolves into new forms, we may need to revise the following
description.
The Criminal Division of the Justice Department consists of fourteen non-administrative offices and sections.67 Almost every section is
assigned a single (sometimes broad) substantive or procedural focus.
Substantively focused sections bear responsibility for the investigation
and prosecution of a particular type of criminal or crime. Examples
include the Organized Crime and Gang Section, the Fraud Section,
and the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section. Procedurally focused
sections help the substantively focused sections and the U.S. Attorney
offices in the field navigate a particular phase of a criminal case or
type of procedural hurdle. Examples include the Appellate Section,
Office of International Affairs, and Office of Policy and Legislation.
One section that departs significantly from this model, as a
master of both substance and procedure, is the Computer Crime and
Intellectual Property Section (“CCIPS”).68 Much of CCIPS’s focus is
66. Some of the facts described in this subpart are known to me from the experience I
gleaned while a staff attorney for the Justice Department but are difficult to find
independently documented. I have tried to find documentary support for the most
important facts underpinning my argument. Errors involving uncited facts are my
responsibility alone.
67. Criminal Division: Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/about/orgchart.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
68. CCIPS is not the only section with a dual mission. Another notable example is the
Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, which focuses on both procedures for
seizing assets in any case (criminal or civil) as well as the substantive federal criminal law of
money laundering. See Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/afmls/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
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substantive: it oversees the nation’s computer hacking and criminal
intellectual property laws.69 But a pocket of CCIPS attorneys focuses
on the procedural question of access to information stored on computers and computer networks. This unit was unofficially, and affectionately, called the “ECPA Team” when I was a member. It serves as a
national clearinghouse for field agents and prosecutors for advice on
the constitutional and statutory laws governing law enforcement access to the content of email accounts, web traffic logs, standalone
computers, cell phones, and more.70
That CCIPS has taken on such an important role can probably be
attributed to the influence and stature of its founder and the fact that
most lawyers know little about technology. The single, most important
force behind the creation of CCIPS was Scott Charney, now
Microsoft’s Vice President for Trustworthy Computing. Mr. Charney
created CCIPS in 1996.71 It was likely his influence and vision at the
time that led the Justice Department’s front office to entrust CCIPS
with a broad mandate to advise the field on matters of both procedure
and substance. Charney’s successors and the scores of line attorneys
who have been through CCIPS have proved to be good stewards of
this responsibility.
Expansions of authority within an organization as vast as the
Criminal Division often set off a zero-sum challenge to the authority
of another unit. CCIPS’s focus on electronic surveillance overlapped
in important ways with the mission of another unit: the OEO. OEO
“oversees the use of the most sophisticated investigative tools at the
Department’s disposal.”72 This crisp mission statement belies the odd
mix of authorities within OEO’s purview, including entry into the witness protection program, subpoenas directed at attorneys and the
press, and even gambling device registration.73 OEO is perhaps best
known in federal criminal law enforcement as an important bureaucratic check placed before those who would administer a lawful wiretap.74 According to federal law, all applications to the court for orders
69. Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
70. Id.
71. David J. Goldstone & Peter J. Toren, The Criminalization of Trademark Counterfeiting,
31 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998).
72. Office of Enforcement Operations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/oeo/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
73. See id.
74. Charles H. Kennedy & Peter P. Swire, State Wiretaps and Electronic Surveillance After
September 11, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 971, 983–84 (2003).
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for a wiretap must first be approved by a specified political appointee
of the Justice Department.75 In most routine cases, Justice Department rules delegate this authority to OEO.76
The overlap between OEO and CCIPS operates on two levels.
First, the Wiretap Act, a law dating to 1968, was expanded significantly
in 1986 to cover wiretapping that occurs on computer networks.77
Field agents and prosecutors hoping to wiretap a computer network
probably need to seek the advice of both units—OEO because of its
role in approving wiretap requests and CCIPS for technological assistance. Both units consider it their responsibility to oversee the consistent application of the Wiretap Act. The overlap of responsibility is
even more apparent when one considers the relative rarity of computer wiretapping with a court order. According to the annual Wiretap Report, law enforcement officers seek orders to wiretap computer
networks fewer than ten times each year.78 Yet anecdotal experience
suggests that wiretap-eligible surveillance happens more often by at
least an order of magnitude. The vast majority of computer network
surveillance never gets submitted to a judge and thus never falls
within the Wiretap Report because it falls within an exception to the
order requirement. Wiretapping a computer network without an order is permitted, for example, with the consent of a party,79 if it is
necessary to protect a provider’s rights and property,80 or if it is subject to the so-called computer trespasser exception, which allows wiretap surveillance to track an unauthorized intruder.81
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2006) (assigning authority for this power to “[t]he Attorney
General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney
General, any acting Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General
or acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division or National Security
Division” (citation omitted)).
76. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-7.110 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/7mcrm.htm
(“When Justice Department review and approval of a proposed application for electronic
surveillance is required, the Electronic Surveillance Unit (ESU) of the Criminal Division’s
Office of Enforcement Operations will conduct the initial review of the necessary pleadings
. . . .”).
77. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. I, 100
Stat. 1848 (1986).
78. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, WIRETAP REPORT 2011 tbl. 6 (2011),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2011/2011Wire
Tap.pdf (listing four orders nationwide for wiretaps for calendar year 2011).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2006).
80. Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
81. Id. § 2511(2)(i).
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The second overlap is less formal. Keeping up with electronic surveillance requires a team of lawyers who can understand both law and
technology. The clean statutory division between wiretaps and stored
communications—and thus the line between OEO and CCIPS—does
not make sense from a technological focus. Packets flow and stop and
flow again, making the lines between surveillance statutes quite arbitrary, and doing the same to the lines between Justice Department
offices.82
Though counterintuitive, the conflict between offices may be a
feature, not a bug. We should celebrate the fact that two different,
independent subunits of the Justice Department are locked in a contest for policymaking authority.
But we should not celebrate what appears to be the Justice Department’s way of resolving the possible turf wars that arise from this
arrangement. The Justice Department seems to prefer tamping down
the conflict, treating each new question as a “jump ball” between the
sections. Once the jump ball is controlled—once one section or the
other asserts its authority over a particular subject and is deemed the
winner by management—it seems to bear precedential force. This
might be sound managerial practice, but it may not be the best approach for civil liberties or the nation.
Consider the empirical proof that the Justice Department has
been doling out electronic surveillance subjects between the two offices. It is difficult for an outsider to peer inside the black box of Criminal Division work assignments. One of the only external clues we have
appears in the signature block of briefs submitted in cases involving
electronic surveillance. These signatures are summarized in the appearances block of published court opinions.83 In Westlaw’s ALLFEDS
database, OEO appears twelve times, and CCIPS appears seven times.
Because Department of Justice attorneys do not always list their home
office, I conducted the search using the names of CCIPS and OEO
attorneys that I know focus on electronic surveillance issues.84
82. See United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 72–79 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing
whether “electronic communication” within the scope of ECPA is limited to communications traveling through wires or includes communications temporarily stored on a
computer).
83. A potential problem with this method is that unpublished opinions and cases,
which are briefed but disposed of without any opinion, do not easily reveal the attorneys
who authored the brief. There is no reason to suspect that such cases would reflect a break
from the identified trend.
84. The list I used was: “nathan /2 judish”; “richard /2 downing”; “josh /2 goldfoot”;
“jenny /2 ellickson”; and “mark /2 eckenwiler.”
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Let me offer a few observations from this admittedly thin empirical base. First, in my research, OEO and CCIPS attorneys never appear together on a brief. Second, when a topic has arisen that might
have reasonably fallen within either section, it has typically been assigned to only one section. From these observations, we can infer that
OEO likely has authority over cell-site tracking cases,85 while CCIPS
governs email search warrant cases.86
Assuming this inference is correct, these choices might be defensible. The Justice Department’s cell-site approach has included some
relatively exotic investigative tools such as All Writs Act orders with
which OEO probably has dealt more than CCIPS. Likewise, search
warrants for email rely heavily on an understanding of computer network design, perhaps falling more within CCIPS’s core competency.
But rather than merely being the product of rational assignment
based on competence, the division of labor probably represents the
strong influence of path dependence. One office, for whatever reason, probably embraced a topic first or invested a lot of time and resources into it earlier, and the choice stuck. One can imagine a file
stored on the shared network drive of the staff of the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division that lays out the elaborate decision tree dictating who has jurisdiction over what topic.
Put to one side the happy accident that resulted in two sections
with overlapping authority. I am not claiming that this was the product of superior institutional design. Rather, I am arguing that insofar
as the Justice Department has attempted to eliminate the overlap, it is
making a mistake. It is far better that two offices be allowed to debate,
disagree, and even negotiate the terms of the federal government’s
approach to new forms of electronic surveillance.
C. The Benefits of Intra-Branch Debate
The many benefits of intra-branch debate outweigh its potential
downsides. First, two voices are better than one. When two sections
independently assess a particular issue, both agreement and disagreement can be telling—the former for lending strength in numbers to
the assessment and the latter for introducing competing approaches.
85. See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (briefed and
argued by OEO).
86. See, e.g., Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (briefed by
CCIPS).
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Second, through accident, path dependence, or intentional design, different subcomponents of the Justice Department tend to take
on varying approaches and personalities. Consider the political structure of the Department. For example, CCIPS and OEO are led by
section chiefs who report to separate Deputy Assistant Attorney
Generals (“DAAG”s)—a title given to both political appointees and
career civil servants. The DAAGs who oversee CCIPS and OEO each
oversee other sections.87 The CCIPS DAAG also oversees the Human
Rights and Special Prosecutions Section and the Organized Crime
and Gang Section.88 Because organized crime tends to be the focus of
many incoming Attorney Generals (and the Presidents who appoint
them), it seems likely that this DAAG will often know more about
gangs than electronic surveillance. Moreover, those who are qualified
to lead the Justice Department’s organized crime agenda are likely
former organized crime prosecutors themselves, possibly even something approaching the caricature of the hard-nosed, aggressive prosecutor type commonly depicted in movies and television. In contrast,
the OEO DAAG oversees the Public Integrity Section (“PIN”).89 PIN, a
highly specialized section, oversees investigations of elected and appointed public officials suspected of criminal corruption.90 Traditionally, the OEO DAAG has been a career civil servant, a job that stays
with one person for a long time, rather than shifts with every new
Attorney General.91 Thus, one can imagine that the person longing to
stand above OEO and PIN must be a careful public servant who is
content with chasing corrupt politicians and judges rather than gang
leaders.
This seems like a significant distinction. The DAAGs overseeing
CCIPS and OEO differ in almost every relevant way. The CCIPS
DAAG is politically appointed, whereas the OEO DAAG is a career
appointee, presumably unbeholden to the politics of a particular
party. CCIPS DAAGs tend to turn over frequently and routinely when
a new Attorney General takes office, whereas OEO DAAGs are known
87. Criminal Division Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/about/orgchart.html.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Public Integrity Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
pin/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
91. During my time at the Justice Department, the DAAG overseeing OEO was Jack
Keeney, who had held the post for many years and, indeed, served for an incredibly long
time in the Justice Department. See Jerry Markon, Leaving Justice After 59 Years, WASH. POST,
Sept. 28, 2010, at B03.
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for their long tenures in office. While CCIPS DAAGs focus on organized crime and gangs, OEO DAAGs instead focus on rooting out public corruption. At the risk of reading too much into this distinction,
one can imagine how these two different areas of focus inculcate different ideas about values and public service. Professor Katyal makes a
similar point about the differences between the State and Defense Departments on national security matters, quoting the old saying that
“[w]here you stand is a function of where you sit.”92
The differences between CCIPS and OEO go beyond management. They also have different relationships with the field. Because
OEO plays a gatekeeping role for attorneys and agents seeking wiretapping orders, OEO can be a bureaucratic hurdle. In contrast, CCIPS
attorneys tend to possess seemingly magical powers—they act as the
guardians of highly technical knowledge that people in the field tend
not to possess.93
D. What Intra-Branch Separation of Powers Would Look Like
Because of these differences in focus, makeup, management, and
relationships with the field of the two sections, CCIPS and OEO
should be consulted simultaneously to weigh in on difficult and novel
questions regarding electronic surveillance. This can take many forms.
Prosecutors in the field may be instructed more often to call both
offices for informal advice or formal briefing. Political appointees who
run the Department of Justice may do the same. Rules may be drafted
instructing OEO and CCIPS attorneys to act as consultants on new
matters and to comment upon, if not co-author, court briefs.
As with any call for a new bureaucratic process, this will add inefficiency and take more time, but it will be worth the costs. Nevertheless, this proposal should be restricted to cases of new technology and
unresolved case law, the Bleeding Edge cases mentioned earlier.
When an issue involves an old technology or well-settled questions of
law, the Settled and Leading Edge categories, one section should be
able to address the question on its own.
Sometimes exigencies will not permit sufficient time to consult
both agencies. The FBI may want to conduct a particular form of surveillance to prevent a prospective crime or to avoid flight. In those
92. Katyal, supra note 8, at 2324–27 (internal quotations omitted).
93. This quick summary, like so much of the anecdotal information in this essay,
helps prove the point but belies the true complexity of the situation. In reality, some OEO
attorneys are likely trusted in the field for their knowledge and good counsel, while some
CCIPS attorneys are probably seen as officious bureaucrats.
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cases, review by the other section can come ex post, assuming each
section is obligated to disclose to the other section the decision made
and share the underlying evidence.94
The point of the exercise is not to encourage constant disagreement and bickering. In some cases, the two sections will probably
agree when both are guided by the same legal concepts and understandings of technology. But disagreements will probably happen too,
stemming from differences in the sections’ institutional roles, personalities, predictions about future trends, or even worldviews. Each disagreement will require a tiebreaking ruling by a neutral arbiter, and
because these two sections are managed by different DAAGs, this
tiebreaking will likely be performed by the Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the Criminal Division.
This is an appropriate use of the Justice Department’s resources.
Technology moves rapidly, and basic civil liberties are in play with
each advance. The higher echelons of Justice Department management should be involved when new, highly invasive techniques are proposed. Today, police officers and prosecutors around the country
weigh constitutional and statutory law in deciding what type of process
is needed, if any, for surveillance of cell phone networks, GPS
beepers, and cloud computing services. In making these determinations, which impact the personal privacy of millions of citizens, it
would be wise to involve politically appointed managers—people who
are accountable directly to the voting population. If those outside law
enforcement cannot take a seat at the table during these deliberations, at the very least, their interests should be represented by those
who are most politically sensitive.
When the sections agree—deciding that a new surveillance technique requires high or low levels of process—the public should have
greater confidence in the result because it was reached independently
and from different vantage points. When the sections disagree—with
one section recommending higher levels of process and the other recommending lower levels of process—upper-level management will
need to break the tie. Whether this will result in a net gain or loss for
civil liberties is difficult to predict. If the section that would have had
authority absent this check opted for lower levels of process, then adding a new voice would increase the odds of a favorable result for civil
liberties. If the reverse was true, it would result in less favorable results
94. See Katyal, supra note 8, at 2326 (recommending ex post review of national security decisions “when responding to disaster or sudden invasion”).
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for civil liberties. It is impossible to say categorically which is more
likely to occur.
E. Spurring Intra-Branch Debate About Electronic Surveillance
If we can protect privacy from unwarranted, invasive new forms of
electronic surveillance by pitting parts of the Justice Department
against one another, how can we spur this change? We may apply pressure from outside the executive branch. Congress, for example, may
try to utilize its oversight power to pressure the administration to refer
electronic surveillance matters to more than one subpart of the Department. The executive branch is likely to resist too much pressure.
Congress can also act indirectly, for example, by requesting regular
reporting about the number of components or attorneys in the Justice
Department who are consulted regarding new forms of electronic surveillance. Congress can also rely on softer, less formal mechanisms—
hearings, letters, or political pressure—to encourage this result.
The judiciary may also put pressure on the Justice Department to
gather advice from beyond a narrow sphere of advisors. For example,
a judge faced with a particularly narrow brief may ask for supplemental briefing. Judges can also take note of the subcomponents represented on the signature page of a brief and place pressure on
attorneys to expand the range of advisors.
The Justice Department itself can and should assign responsibility
for electronic surveillance to different sections within the Criminal Division. Once again, CCIPS and OEO are the most logical choices for
such a division of labor. Other components may also play a relevant
role, such as the Fraud, Narcotics and Dangerous Drug, and Child
Exploitation and Obscenity Sections, since each of these sections investigate crimes using electronic surveillance. Finally, the Justice Department should consider the split authority for electronic
surveillance as it allocates hiring authority to the sections, ensuring
that talented and technically knowledgeable attorneys continue to be
staffed in both OEO and CCIPS.

Conclusion
As reformers urge Congress to overhaul ECPA and appeal to the
Supreme Court to reinvent the Fourth Amendment, they must take
care not to ignore the full set of tools at their disposal. Thus far, efforts to reform surveillance law have focused almost entirely on interbranch proposals that give the judiciary greater oversight over requests to conduct surveillance. Reformers should supplement these
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efforts with appeals directed at the Justice Department itself to find
ways to increase the frequency, depth, and importance of intra-agency
oversight over electronic surveillance. This is not a supplement for
other forms of reform; we need greater judicial oversight in addition
to this proposal.
Meanwhile, the type of institutional analysis advocated should extend beyond this relatively narrow concept. It is likely that every state
attorney general’s office, U.S. Attorney’s office, and county district attorney’s office has a divide like the one between OEO and CCIPS.
Reformers with local knowledge should encourage government officials to engage in the intra-agency debate and deliberation described
above. One voice is good, but two are better.

